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NEWS OF CRIME: COURTS AND PRESS IN CONFLICT By J. Edward
Gerald. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1983. Pp. x, 227.
$29.95.

When the media seeks unlimited access to court proceedings and
trial-related information, the first and sixth amendments come into direct conflict. This conflict has been aptly called the "civil libertarians'
nightmare." 1 J. Edward Gerald,2 in News of Crime: Courts and Press
in Conflict, examines this conflict from a sociological and historical
1. United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1972); Bridges v. California, 314
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perspective. His approach is a refreshing change from the traditional
constitutional analysis of media access and can be appreciated by lawyers and laypersons alike. Gerald's proclaimed purpose is to "dispel
misconceptions based on irritation and anger and to encourage peace
between the courts and the press" (p. viii). The book clearly and comprehensively3 describes the history of both the media's push for courtroom access and· the response of the legal community; however,
Gerald falls short in his ability to analyze the conflict critically. Gerald, a journalist himself, is unable to conceal his favoritism for the
press over the courts. This personal bias limits the value of this purportedly objective analysis.
In his outline of the historical developments, Gerald concentrates
on the ABA standards governing media access,4 legislative shield laws
protecting reporters' sources, and cameras in the courtroom - and
examines the courts' response to these developments. Gerald also discusses the development of gag orders and bench, bar, and press councils in order to show how the press has gradually gained more freedom
in its court reporting.
The ABA in 1966 appointed a fair trial/free press committee
which proposed fairly restrictive standards. They prescribed, for example, that a judge could restrict comment by the news media if the
comment was "reasonably likely" to prejudice the trial. These standards were approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States
two years later. In 1978 the standards were made more conciliatory
toward the media. The revised standards make clear that the presumption now is "strongly in favor of open judicial proceedings and
unsealed records." 5 The new rules permit judges to close pretrial proceedings only if there is a "clear and present danger" that their reports
will prejudice the trial. 6 In addition, prior restraints are prohibited.
Gerald devotes an entire chapter to the reporters' claimed privilege
not to reveal their sources and the legislative shield laws protecting
that privilege. The judicial response to the shield laws has been hostile
despite increasing legislative receptivity. The Supreme Court, in
U.S. 252,260 (1941) ("[F]ree speech and fair trials are two of the most cherished policies of our
civilization, and it would be a trying task to choose between them.").
2. J. Edward Gerald is an active journalist and one of the founders of the pioneering Minne•
sota News Council. His books include SOCIAL REsPONSIBILITY OF THE PRESS (1963), THE
BRITISH PRESS UNDER GOVERNMENT EcoNOMIC CoNTROLS (1956), and THE PRESS AND THE
CoNSTITUTION (1948).
3. News of Crime is a highly structured work. Each of the seven chapters is divided and
subdivided. While this adds clarity, the format is somewhat dry and resembles a textbook.
4. The ABA in 1966 appointed a fair trial/free press committee which proposed a draft of
standards for criminal justice known as the Reardon Report. The committee is ongoing and
proposes revised drafts of the standards, which are contained in STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JurncE ch. 8 (1982).
5. P. 43 (citing STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE §§ 8-3.1 through 8-3.7 (1982)),
6, P. 44 (citing STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 8-3.2 (1982)),
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Branzburg v. Hayes, 1 placed clear limits on the scope of this special
testamentary privilege. It required reporters "to respond to grand jury
subpoenas as other citizens do and to answer questions relevant to an
investigation into the commission of a crime." 8 Despite this seeming
setback to reporters, this case has been interpreted narrowly,9 and
many courts have developed a qualified first amendment privilege
based on the three-pronged test suggested by Justice Stewart in his
dissent in Branzburg. 10
Gerald's pro-media bias is revealed in his discussion of the legislative shield. He presents numerous cases in which ''journalistic martyrs" have gone to jail rather than reveal their sources (pp. 115, 150).
He states that shield laws are necessary to provide the "legal protection [that] is needed for the journalists' watchdog role" (p. 115) - to
keep leaders competent and honest. But he neglects to present the
opposing position, that granting writers the special privilege of not
having to account for the source or veracity of their published information may threaten a fair trial where specific rules of evidence and
burdens of proof must be followed. In addition, some commentators
criticize the singling out of journalists for this special privilege, noting
both the resulting public resentment toward journalists and the negative consequences for journalists of allowing the government to identify and regulate them as a profession. 11
Gerald next presents a· good summary of the development of law
concerning the broadcasting of criminal trials. He discusses the sensationalist trial in Estes v. Texas, 12 which provoked the ABA ban on
televised trials, and the erosion of that ban over the succeeding years.
He accurately explains how the media organized and successfully
challenged the ban in many states. The review is fairly thorough given
the limited coverage the topic must receive in a book examining the
broader conflicts of the courts and the press. Typical of the author's
style throughout the book, the chapter is enlivened by descriptions of
cases in which the conflict over broadcasting of a criminal trial arose.
The only shortcoming once again is the pro-media bias. Gerald under7. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
8. P. 130 (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682).
9. Branzburg v. Hayes was a 5-4 decision. Justice Powell's concurrence, which emphasizes
the limited nature of the Court's holding, has been cited by circuits narrowly interpreting the
decision. Powell states that newsmen still have available protective orders from the courts
"where legitimate First Amendment interests require protection." Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710.
10. Pp. 132-33 (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 743) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("I would hold
that the government must (1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the newsman has
information which is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that
the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of the First
Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in the
information.").
11. See, e.g., Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journalism?, 1 HOFSTRA L. REv. 595 (1979).
12. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
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states the disruption the cameras caused in Estes (a case which is still
good law) and does not sufficiently explore the potential psychological
distractions caused by cameras that can prejudice a trial.
Gerald's prejudice is most evident in his analyses of the competing
groups. He describes the courts as ponderous and inefficient institutions (pp. 6-7, 14-15). He denigrates the sixth amendment by characterizing it as a "rule" constraining judges and putting courts in conflict
with the media (pp. 12, 14). The press, on the other hand, is the hero
in the book. It is "an underdog in the face of so formidable an opponent" (p. 7); it has as its main goal to seek truth and inform the public.
The journalist is, "in effect, an agent of the government in tracking
down crime. . . [who] brings controversial allegations into the open"
(p. 21). He stands "alert to report corruption, bribery, and flagrant
misuse of political power" (p. 115). Gerald never suggests the possibility that the writer, eager for a scoop, may hastily report an unsubstantiated rumor as fact, or distort the truth through editorialized articles.
The clearest example of his bias occurs in the introduction:
Persons of high purpose and low tap the journalist's phones and subpoena his long distance phone bill in order to harass his sources, to fence
him in. He has to hire a lawyer to keep himself out of jail while he does
the day's work. The state, it seems to him, searches not so much for
truth as for journalists who know something that will give the district
attorney a lead, or to help the defense impeach an adverse witness.
If the journalist succeeds in getting a statute passed for access to official records, so as to make news gathering easier, the opponents attempt
to restore the old restrictions by developing an artificially cultured new
tort called "invasion of privacy." [P. 13.]

Gerald overstates the reach of this restriction. He neglects to mention
that the claim of invasion of privacy has been held by the Supreme
Court not to prevent a journalist from truthfully reporting information
on public record. 13
At one point Gerald does criticize the media and contends that it is
in part the fault of the journalists that they are petitioners rather than
partners in their relationship with the courts. He explains that journalists are organizationally unready to act as partners (p. 5). They
lack a coherent organization, self-government, and "a willingness to
accept public responsibility for professional standards" (p. 183). Gerald concedes that this is in part a deliberate decision in line with the
journalists' desire for absolute freedom, and their belief "that the act
of defining freedom means limiting it" (p. 184), but retorts that "[t]his
position, while described as one of freedom, is also one of irresponsibility" (p. 183). As a consequence, "as far as reporting of crime news is
13. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); see also Globe Newspaper Co.
v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (striking down a Massachusetts statute closing criminal
trials for sexual offenses involving victims under the age of 18 from the press and general public
during testimony of the minor victims).
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concerned, the Supreme Court will set the standards, as it has done
since 1966, not the professional press. This is not necessarily undesirable but it does confine journalism to an underdog role in determining
its own freedom" (p. 184).
Laypersons, lawyers, and journalists seeking a thorough and concise overview of the development of the fair trial/free press controversy will find this book of value. It covers the major areas of the
conflict, outlines their historical development, and contains numerous
examples from the law. But any reader should be aware that it is written by a journalist who advocates an expanded freedom of the press in
reporting about criminal trials without always making his advocacy
clear to the reader.

